Intelligence

Société de stratégie:

http://www.societe-de-strategie.asso.fr/

Agir, revue

http://www.societe-de-strategie.asso.fr/agirpr.php

<Abstract>

“L’Inde empiète sur notre domaine réservé : la matière grise. Et le secret de son succès spectaculaire, c’est, tout simplement, l’inégalité. (…) Sans nous en rendre compte, nous importons, en même temps que les logiciels conçus à New Dehli ou Bangalore, les caractéristiques de la société indienne: l’élitisme et les inégalités. Deux ingrédients explosifs pour une société française attachée aux vertus de l’égalité et aux acquis sociaux.”

</Abstract>

<Sommaire>

<Introduction>Pourquoi nos rivaux sont indiens (et pas chinois)</Introduction>

<Chapitre 1>Eldorado pour délocalisation high tech</Chapitre 1>

<Chapitre 2>La possibilités des îles<Chapitre 2>

<Chapitre 3>Mise en orbitre: middle class et global indians</Chapitre 3>

<Chapitre 4>La dynamique inégalitaire<Chapitre4>

<Chapitre 5>Les limites des îles</Chapitre 5>

<Chapitre 6>Le grand malentendu altermondialiste</Chapitre 6>

<Chapitre 7>Petit malentendu colbertiste</Chapitre 7>

<Chapitre 8>La dispute</Chapitre 8>

<Conclusion>Le prix de l’Inde</Conclusion>

</Sommaire>

<Auteur>

Eve Charrin est journaliste. Elle a vécu trois ans en Inde et publie régulièrement sur des sujets économiques et internationnaux.

</Auteur>

<Abstract>

“Micromotives and Macrobehavior opens a profoundly important window on social behavior of all kind”

</Abstract>

<Sommaire>

<Preface>

<Acknowledgments>

<Part 1>Micromotives and Macrobehavior</Part 1>

<Part 2>The inescapable mathematics of musical chairs</Part 2>

<Part 3>Thermostats, lemons and other families of Models</Part 3>

<Part 4>Sorting and Mixing: Race and Sex</Part 4>

<Part 5>Sorting and Mixing: Age and Income</Part 5>

<Part 6>Choosing our children’s gene</Part 6>

<Part 7>Hokey Helmets, daylight saving, and other binary choices</Part 7>

<Part 8>An astonishing sixty years: the legacy of Hiroshima (The Nobel Lecture></Part 8>

</Sommaire>

<Auteur>

Thomas C. Schelling was awarded the 2005 Nobel Prize for Economic Science. He is Distinguished Professor of Economics and Public Policy at the University of Maryland. Previously, he was professor of political economy at Harvard University. His other books include The Strategy of Conflict, Choice and Consequence, and Arms and Influence.

</Auteur>

<Abstract>

“Professor Schelling’s work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence.”

</Abstract>

<Sommaire>

<Part 1>Elements of a theory of Strategy</Part 1>

<Chapter 1>The retarded science of International Strategy</Chapter 1>

<Chapter 2> An essay on Bargaining</Chapter 2>

<Chapter 3>Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War</Chapter 3>

<Part 2>A reorientation of Game theory</Part 2>

<Chapter 4> Toward a theory of Interdependant Decision</Chapter 4>

<Chapter 5>Enforcement, Communication, and Strategic Moves</Chapter 5>

<Chapter 6>Game theory and Experimental Research</Chapter 6>

<Part 3>Strategy with a random Ingredient</Part 3>

<Chapter 7>Randomisation of Promises and Threats</Chapter 7>

<Chapter 8>The threat that leaves something to chance</Chapter 8>

<Part 4>Surprise Attack: A Study in Mutual Distrust</Part 4>

<Chapter 9>The reciprocal fear of Surprise Attack</Chapter 9>

<Chapter 10>Surprice Attack and Disarmament</Chapter 10>

<Appendices/>

<Part A>Nuclear Weapons and Limited War</Part A>

<Part B>For the abandonment of Symmetry in Game Theory</Part B>

<Part C>Re-interpretation of a solution Concept for “Noncooperative” Games<Part C>

</Sommaire>

<Auteur>

Thomas C. Schelling was awarded the 2005 Nobel Prize for Economic Science. He is Distinguished Professor of Economics and Public Policy at the University of Maryland. Previously, he was professor of political economy at Harvard University. His other books include The Strategy of Conflict, Choice and Consequence, and Arms and Influence.

</Auteur>

<Abstract>

“The complexity of cooperation is exciting because it seeks to model how changes in the identities of populations of actors could take place. (..) This book is not merely important; it’s fun.”

</Abstract>

<Sommaire>

<Introduction/>

<Part 1>Evolving New Strategies</Part 1>

<Part 2>Coping with Noise</Part 2>

<Part 3>Promoting Norms</Part 3>

<Part 4>Choosing Sides</Part 4>

<Part 5>Setting Standards</Part 5>

<Part 6>Building New Political Actors</Part 6>

<Part 7>Disseminating Culture</Part 7>

<Appendixes/>

<Part A>Replication f Agent-Based Models</Part A>

<Part B>Resources for Agent-based Modeling</Part B>

</Sommaire>

<Auteur>

Robert Axelrod is the Arthur W. Bromage Distinguished University Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at he University of Michigan. His work on cooperation and norms has received has received awards from the American Association for the Advancement of Science, The American Political Association, the MacArthur Foundation, and the National Academy of Sciences.

</Auteur>

“(…) très largement saluée lors de sa récente publication aux Etats Unis, il montre en quoi la peur constitue un levier fondamental du pouvoir, même dans une démocratie libérale comme la nôtre.”